The article is a policy paper
providing an address on how South Korea utilizes soft power as a diplomatic
strategy to positively shape proximate relations with Northeast Asian countries
and with other regions, especially in the case of culture with specific mention
of the hallyu/hanryu or Korean Wave
and its prospect of improving relations in defense, politics, and economics.
Cabalza [2011] begins his discourse with a “then and
now” comprehensive political cultural background of Korea. As a result of
Japanese occupation and the Korean War, the 1950s saw a theme of poverty,
characterized by a bleak economy with shattered infrastructures and drained
resources. South Korea eventually achieved rapid economic growth, enough to
emerge along the lines of prospectively being recognized as a tiger
economy. What remains however, is the
reality of a divided Korea as victim of the Cold War. It has been mentioned
that while indoctrination strategies during the Korean War had conditioned both
sides to view each other as the foremost enemy, hopes of unification is
maintained grounded with the strong sense of brotherhood left untouched between
the south and north. This places a dilemma on South Korea’s defense diplomacy
where the concern is to achieve the ability to contain the dangers (which are
and may be) posed by North Korea, without the prospect of peaceful unification
becoming compromised.
As read,
Korean political culture also places emphasis on the value of education, with
the kyo yuk yeol phenomenon (also
known as ‘education fever’) having paved the way for achieving a
knowledge-based economy; the transition from being agricultural to industrial,
with its large pool of educated citizens and human capital. This was said to
have developed the South Korean educational system to produce a significantly
high educational literacy rate reaching almost one hundred percent. However,
there have been accounts from some Korean nationals lamenting the rigorous
selectiveness the local (educational) system has ---- and this places the
question of the lack of compassion and to an extent challenge the confidence of
credibility placed in KYY. Speculatively
speaking, if the intention was always to improve citizen quality, it should
have been all throughout, meaning to assist especially those whose academic
performances are weak. As a result, if these people have failed in the
selection process, their integration in this desired census of South Korean
society would be possible through getting a college education elsewhere which
on some occasions also by consequence includes some change in values attained.
Hence observed the pouring of South Korean scholars into the Philippines, as it
has been mentioned that tuition fees and cost of living is very affordable as
well as the apparent sense of touristic indifference [Dumont: 1984] blatant in
varied versions of “Korean Towns”, the import of delicacies, as well as the
indigenization of gastronomic Korean culture as tell-tale indicators.
The more
complex and recent of developments in South Korean political culture is the
rebranding of Korea as one of the defining cornerstones of the Lee
administration [Cheng: 2010; Cabalza 2011: 03]. As is known, the essence of
rebranding requires the building of a national consensus [Olins 2005: 172] on X
whatever that may be. This priority involves, to quote Olins [2005] in
verbatim: …the creation and modulation of reputations in order to create
domestic loyalties and coherence and promote their own power and influence in
neighboring countries. Cabalza [2011] mentions the establishment of the
Presidential Committee on Nation Branding in 22 January 2009 by council
chairman Euh Yoon-dae and dignitaries including the Korean Culture Minister and
the Seoul Tourism Organization president. It is further mentioned that the
Presidential Council is formed by government officials and civilian experts
from varied fields to coordinate government efforts to raise overall standards
in Korean society for the improvement of national image in the international
community.
Pursuing the
programme of rebranding also means that South Korea is recognizant that she is
in direct and overt competition with other nations. According to Olins [2005], each nation has to
be clear and enthusiastic with its projection of national brand through three
areas: brand export; foreign direct investment; and tourism. Cabalza [2011]
mentioned the subject of Korea’s branded export economy of internationally
known labels such as Samsung, Hyundai Kia, and LG (which scholars mention are
Chaebols) and this is a primary exemplification; it may be posited that this
was also the first defining element of their soft power strategy. There is however that favorite, perennial question
of stability: Would global appeal for
Korean brands be affected by political developments? (What would count as a political development?) And if so, Would there be any chance and manner for
resilience? Olins’ areas, though mentioned in a 2005
article (perhaps earlier), are lacking a fourth which is greatly applicable
today: Migration. As tourism is a means of encouraging people to buy certain
brands, a considerably more relatable reason for patronage would be a type of
consumerism driven by (either or both) practicality and sentimentality expected
on the part of migrants. Popular patronage would of course contribute to
credibility and hence sales, and as mentioned in Cabalza [2011: 01] this gave
rise to the first conceptualization of the Korean Wave called Hallyu --- coined in China in the year 1999 “…by
Beijing journalists who were startled by the growing popularity of South
Koreans and South Korean goods in China”. It may be contended that the second
wave is in a form that more people could relate to as well as identify its
“cultural” roots --- the Hanryu definition
provided by a Professor Kang Chul-Keun [2006 cited in Cabalza 2011: 01] is
based on a wave which “…mainly originated from popular music, passing through
phenomenal soap operas and films embracing Korean culture as a whole.” There is
however emphasis placed on the dominance of the role TV soap operas have played
in setting the (foundation) of this form of Korean Wave which was in
development since 2000.
The discourse then proceeds with a listing of issues
in South Korea’s new soft power. The first asks the subject of North Korea
remaining a looming presence in South Korean politics while China and Japan are
closely being monitored to tame economic and military rivals co-existing in a
clear and present danger zone, especially in Korea-China-Japan tripartite
relationship. As regards the question of compensation for the hard power
deficit, this is addressed with optimism citing theoretical references from Nye
[2004] and Lee [2008]. There is confidence in Nye’s postulate of soft power
which is characterized by the ability to attract, to get others to want what
one wants. ‘Attractive power’ is mentioned to be separate from ‘influence’ as
the latter may bank on hard power threats or payment. It is further expanded
how soft power of a country depends on its culture, political values at home
and abroad, as well as its legitimate foreign policies which have moral
authority. Usage of a soft power
strategy as diplomatic tool makes sense in the South Korean context considering
perception of the country as a middle power which as of now is unable to substantially
compete along hard power terms with its neighbors, China and Japan. Cabalza
[2011] writes that according to Lee [2008], South Korea’s role is in being a
‘hub nation’ or ‘regional balancer’ with the function of being an intermediary,
made possible as both the Japanese and Chinese tend to view Korean soft power
in a more positive light than they do each other.
For a matter
of personal opinion, there are a few insights as well as considerations as
regards the substance proper of South Korea’s soft power. The South Korean case
is a fairly concrete example reinforcing the impression of the Eurocentric
character that subjects falling under the ‘political’ has, and should be
outdated by now because of the openness of borders and hence minds. There have
long been calls for the balancing of perspectives ---- the need for undergraduate
schools of politics and governance around the globe to include oriental
political thought in the curriculum. Pursuing a soft power strategy is the more
effective position that South Korea can place itself in for the time
being. But as students of politics are
assessing country cases in accordance to a tradition and habit of the hard
power vista, it makes one ask if there is something truly wrong with
predominantly playing the role of regional balancer for a more prolonged period
of time than expected.
It is
mentioned in Cheng [2010] that Nye was consulted and that the project team
behind the strategy had received training via special lectures from him upon
invitation from the Korea Foundation and the East Asian Institute in February
of 2008. It would be of interest to interrogate
Nye’s framing of ‘soft power’ compared to that in general IR used by
diplomats. A regular feature of
description is how soft power is rooted
largely in a country’s values expressed through its culture in handling its
relations with other states [Ishmael: 2013]. It is now seen how equally
political is the question of how culture should be defined, as well as
what aspects should be considered under its rubric in this given context.
And this is more so the case with a
considerable framing of popular culture (and eventually a distinction from mass culture), since culture and
pop culture have developed a degree of synonymity or rather interchangeability,
at least if speaking with reference to soft power-related news and usability.
And further, how does soft power
diplomacy also differ from cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy? What
is sure is that popular culture can no longer be dismissed as something
non-political given how scholars such as Press-Barnathan [2011] have observed
that key states have begun referring to it as a soft power asset, regardless of
the question of whether or not popular culture can have significant impact on
other foreign policies. The politicization of popular culture is viewed to be
practically by default. According to Press-Barnathan [2011], this nature of
discourse would be classifiable under “High Politics” which is a convenient
catch-all for topics falling beyond if not beside the scopes of the political
economic and economic competition.
To paraphrase
Cabalza [2011], popular culture permits an extent of cultural freedom granting
individuals the intellectual leisure to speak of conflicts between generations,
nationalism, globalism, as well as gender issues. Chul-keun [2006] contended
that it is through the hallyu that for the first time, Asians have a genuine
cultural exchange vehicle which extends to people regardless of their ethnicity
and nationality ---- the sentiments shared were the same while watching Koreans
soap operas and films [Cabalza 2011: 03].
Globalization is also mentioned to have played a bigger role in the
promotion of the Korean wave at a tremendously fast pace; either by going viral
(YouTube) or as basic as television, in various social networks and new media.
The embracing of hanryu also came to mean alternatives to the Western popular
culture that Asians have long been familiar and immersed in [ibid].
The problem
with considering (as well as accepting) popular culture and culture as one and
the same in a framing of soft power is how attraction in this case may not
necessarily be equated or lead to power. The usual conceptual route would be
for popular culture to have the purpose of changing perceptions of a country in
the senses of others who are audience or consumers. In accordance to the
standard framing of soft power via popular culture, in theory subscription would
in turn place governments of audiences in the position to improve their
relations with other states. Of course this would also bring people to ask who
is meant by ‘audience’ as well as ‘consumers’ --- how do citizens receive,
relate, and most crucially react to a TV series, music, and similar? The
subject of being able to identify with a piece of popular culture is tricky in
the sense that popular culture is based on content which has the potential to
exclude just as well as it includes. For it to be appreciated by people outside
a group of its original market, there is the apparent need for baseline
interests and subjects to form part its conceptual premise. With popular
culture always having been consumed and now seen as a soft power asset, it
becomes almost inevitable to see it as a tool to enhance economic hard power. It
is mentioned in Lo [2011] as well as in Press-Barnathan [2011] that the
character of consumption inherent in popular culture might encourage some pop
culture producers to create tangibles and intangibles which may not necessarily
comply with state guidance; but rather manipulate historical animosity, distort
national, cultural elements or similar, just to reach as broad an audience as
possible and stimulate sales. This gives rise to the possibility of the
dictating of commodity production which does not explicitly encode a specific
national culture [Wabuchi cited in Otmazgin & Ben-Ari 2011: 22]. And this
bit has some potential to be stretched out of hand, especially if soap operas
“pull a Kris Aquino” ---- there is the crucial importance to note the fine line
between product placements and the artfully positioned tangible. According to Cabalza [2011: 03], Korean
scholar Chaesung Chun [2008] believes that South Korea’s national image and
values for Global Korea should be prosperous, democratic, modest,
non-threatening, and culturally syncretic countries model South Korea for its
simultaneous achievements of development and democratization.
Returning to
the subject of reaction, if the result is active, that is to say, eliciting
some form of response, it would be valid to consider it as attraction; the
question is if it is positive or negative. Press-Barnathan [2011: 38] states that whether
such an attraction translates into an accommodative approach in consideration
of other state’s policies and political behavior, that is something which isn’t
necessarily guaranteed. While pop culture might encourage people to develop a
positive interest in imported cultures and ideas, this does not necessarily
provide an affirmation of the creation of political influence as expected.
The third matter asks whether or not the success of
the Korean cultural wave (hanllyu) transmitted through TV dramas and other
forms of popular culture would encourage the government to use soft power as a
diplomatic tool. For a matter of humble opinion, it would probably be more
valid to consider hanllyu under the context of public diplomacy. Scholars such
as Bouissou [2011] express pessimism, scribing that the effects of soft power
based on popular culture are almost, by definition, slow and work best when not pursued by governments. According to
Otmazgin & Ben-Ari [2011], this is most likely due to incompatibilities
between these two nouns (popular culture and government). The nature
(democratized) and marketing of popular culture would be best in a flexible and
dynamic environment, while the government being rigid with its old style in
terms of development policies encourages concentration of ownership and scale
economies.
Further on the plus side of assessing hanryu, Cabalza
[2011] mentioned that there has been much talk about this creating a higher
Asian cultural community. Though Korean soap operas, films, and Korean pop
intermarried with music and fashion, Asians who have experienced similar
modernization processes have increased a sense of solidarity among fellow
Asians. There is also a change in terms of their gaze towards the West. He
contends that in the long run, the higher objective of building an Asian cultural
bloc should be reached.
The alternative path of attempting to directly
influence leader’s perceptions via popular culture mechanisms has on instances been busted. One
applicable example (in this topic reach and case) is Kim Jong-Il’s great interest
in American Hollywood movies, which did not clearly translate into policies of
the pro-American sort [Press-Barnathan: 2011].
As for the subject of policy options, the first
regarding the decision of whether to continuously integrate soft power, shift
to hard power, or explore the mixing of both is a good point to entertain. The
safest approach would no doubt be the third, also known as ‘smart power’. The
first of the three possibilities is good as a strategy for a specific
objective; as to employ a series, for example, as an all-purpose is much too
idealistic and still without a sufficient number of studies to support its
effectiveness.
Policy
options two and three discuss the implications soft power has on Korean
identity and role in the political field. The common denominator in the Asian
diplomatic usage of the Korean television series has to do with tropes placing Confucianism
and family relations in the center of story premises. This is what accounts for
the subject of cultural proximity, while simultaneously acting as an inhibitor
on certain occasions. In a New York Times
interview in 2005 of former minister of culture and tourism, Yi O-ryong, he perceives the Hanryu as both signal and
symbol of a glocalization process which can be employed as a means to enhance
and debut the new cultural identity of South Korea, as evidence of a transition
from being a former colony as well as a nation which is an importer of culture
to a main cultural exporter in Asia [Lee: 2008]. To relate this along the
context of the second policy option, the continuation to Yi O-ryong’s comment
is quite interesting. In essence, he states that the “parochial” character the
Hanryu has must be done away with in order to go into global mainstream.
Instead of prolonging the Korean wave, he suggests the creation of a new one
based on universal and natural values “…a sort of digital Oriental wave”. Yi
O-ryong’s remark is one example of the Hanryu discourses which involve the
strategic merger between information technology as well as cultural content. Emphasis
on this duo had the objective of enhancing the collective image of South Korea
as a cultural powerhouse while simultaneously finding means for turning South
Korean products into financial gains under the rubric of cultural
entrepreneurship. Prime Minister Lee Hae-chan stressed the importance of the
expansion and management of Korean pop culture abroad, having the prospects in
mind that these may grant permanence to the image of the nation as an
impressive “IT Power”. This kind of agenda is believed to usher in increased
investment opportunities as well as exports [Lee: 2008].
If to
consider Lee’s [2008] account of the culturalist approach, the third policy
option may to an extent be negated. Lee remarks on how the mainstream
perspectives on Hanryu have disregarded if not deliberately neglected the fact concerning the nature of
South Korean popular cultural products being hybrid as well as relatively new
in terms of cultural construction and have little in relation to traditional
Korean culture or collective popular sentiments [Lee 2008: 184]. To continue,
in verbatim: For instance, they are mostly a mixture of western cultural genres
and formats, and they also convey cosmopolitan imaginaries and sophisticated
urban styles [ibid]. In short, there is nothing uniquely Korean about the pop
culture comprising the Hanryu [Shin: 2005 cited in Lee 2008: 184]. On the other
hand, Lee’s documentation of the culturalist approach grants further
description to the second policy option where this position considers the
possibilities of cross-cultural or transborder dialogues which can be mediated
via Hanryu texts. The culturalist position also grants voice to other bracketed
and or marginalized agents and players in the dominant versions of the flow and
reception of South Korean cultural forms [Lee 2008: 185].
Having been mentioned in Cabalza [2011: 04] that South
Korea’s soft power diplomacy should be applied also in the process of
reconciliation with the North, it leaves scholars of politics wondering which
elements the South will use which might be accepted by the North. Once again,
there is the task of distinguishing high culture from (traditional) culture
from mass culture and pop culture. Aside from this is the necessity to
determine whether or not the element which will be employed has come to develop
any cultural-emotional imprints on it which might result in adding fuel to the
fire (most often the case if it has visual/literary rhetoric woven in this, and
has been criticized through ideological anchoring). On the one end, there can
be the possibility that a television series could be developed solely for this
purpose. If such a thing would be crafted, and is proven effective, this would
surely go down as one of the most fondest moments in the history of conflict
resolution.
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